We have examined the aforesaid discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel. It may be stated herein that some of the issues have been explained by the prosecution, however, no attempt was ever made by the defence to put most of these issues t..

We have examined the aforesaid discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel. It may be stated herein that some of the issues have been explained by the prosecution, however, no attempt was ever made by the defence to put most of these issues to SI Vinod Kumar (PW.20), the Investigating Officer in his cross-examination. It is evident from his deposition that he had, in fact, answered all the questions that were put to him in the cross-examination. However, it is pertinent to clarify that most of these questions that are being currently raised before us were not put to him. For example, he has explained that nobody from the said market had been ready to become the Panch witness for recovery of the mobile phone from Sonu’s shop at Itarsi, and that even Sonu was not ready to do so. Further, no question had been put to him in the cross-examination regarding the different EMEI number of the said mobile phone. The mobile phone that was recovered, bore the EMEI No. 3534000004033852 (Ex.P-19), though the EMEI number of mobile phone that belonged to Sonia was 3534000004033853. Furthermore, no question had been put as to why the mobile phone, after the recovery, had not been deposited in the Malkhana. In light of such a fact situation, it is not permissible for us to consider such discrepancies. 

It is to be borne in mind that suspicion pertaining to fidelity has immense potentiality to commit irreversible wrongs as it corrupts the mind and corrodes the sense of rational thinking and further allows liberty to the mind to pave the path of e..

It is to be borne in mind that suspicion pertaining to fidelity has immense potentiality to commit irreversible wrongs as it corrupts the mind and corrodes the sense of rational thinking and further allows liberty to the mind to pave the path of evil. In fact, it brings in baseness. It quite often impures mind, takes it to the devil’s den and leads one to do unjust acts than just deeds. In any case, it does not give licence to commit murder. Thus, the submission pertaining to the absence of motive has no substance.  In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude and hold that all the links in the chain of evidence are established beyond reasonable doubt and the established circumstances are consistent with the singular hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime and it is totally inconsistent with his innocence. We have said so on the basis of the pronouncements 19Page 20 in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and ors., Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Harischandra Ladaku Thange v. State of Maharashtra  and Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab. Consequently, the appeal, being sans substratum, stands dismissed. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

It is worth mentioning that in the present case the High Court had aquitted both Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6, Fazal Mohd Shaikh. It is from that acquittal that appeals for their conviction and sentencing come before us. While imp..

It is worth mentioning that in the present case the High Court had aquitted both Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6, Fazal Mohd Shaikh. It is from that acquittal that appeals for their conviction and sentencing come before us. While imposing the sentence of life on the accussed the Court must have the judgment of acquittal of the High Court in the back of its mind. In our considered opinion if at least one of the courts below had acquitted the accused person in respect of the crimes for which they are to be sentenced, the burden on the prosecution would be even more heavier, which the State in our opinion has not been able to discharge.  If a person is sentenced to imprisonment, even if it be for life, and subsequently it is found that he was innocent and was wrongly convicted, he can be set free. Of course, the imprisonment that he has suffered till then cannot be undone and the time he has spent in the prison cannot be given back. Such a reversal is not possible where a person has been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. The execution of the sentence of death in such cases makes miscarriage of justice irrevocable. It is a finality which cannot be corrected. And once Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6 Fazal Mohd Shaikh have been sentenced to life there remains no question of awarding a death sentence to Accused 7,Azzizuddin Zahiruddin Shaikh who had played no greater a role in the said incident as Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6 Fazal Mohd Shaikh. All the three accused stand on an equal footing and therefore the sentences to be imposed upon them must not differ. It is for the aforementioned reasons that the appeals filed by the State as regard the imposition of a death Sentence deserves to be dismissed.

The evidence of PW-2 was in line with F.I.R. and his statement given to the police. Apart from minor discrepancies which are bound to appear in a natural course of conduct of a normal human being, there were no serious material discrepancies in th..

The evidence of PW-2 was in line with F.I.R. and his statement given to the police. Apart from minor discrepancies which are bound to appear in a natural course of conduct of a normal human being, there were no serious material discrepancies in the evidence in order to completely discard their evidence. There is no reason to doubt the credibility of all these witnesses. There is no reason why they would falsely try to implicate the appellant. Nothing was shown on record that these witnesses were having strained relations with the appellant. On the other hand, it was clearly made out from the evidence that they were having cordial relations and were visiting each other quite often. [Paras 27 and 29] [1094-B-E] 2. It is manifest from the evidence that the appellant had got himself admitted in Civil Hospital on 4.3.2005 and was under treatment. According to the doctor PW-10, the appellant was admitted on 4.2.2005 at about 6.30 a.m. and was discharged on 7.3.2005. The doctor was not able to conclusively say that any Sulphas tablet was taken by the appellant or not. He deposed that after taking tablets, it is difficult to survive for a long period. Appellant did not offer any explanation as to where was he before his admission in the hospital on the fateful day. Plea of alibi taken by him was not found to be truthful as the same stood falsified from the evidence of PW-4 who had sIndian Penal Code, 1860een him coming out of his own house at 5.00 a.m. This was only indicative of the fact that after commission of the alleged crime, he got himself admitted in the Civil Hospital. It is certain that he had committed the crime sometime in night and then got himself admitted in the hospital at 6.30 a.m. Looking to the totality of the facts and features of the case and keeping in view the evidence available on record, there is no doubt that the offence was committed by the appellant only. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Show

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Section 432 or 433 of Cr.PC, the sentence under Section 376 of IPC shall not be remitted or commuted before seven years of imprisonment. In other words, in that eventuality, it shall be ensured that the respondent will first serve the term of life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. In case there is any remission after fourteen years, then imprisonment for a minimum period of seven years under Section 376 of IPC shall follow and thereafter three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 of IPC. The sentence on fine and default as awarded by the Sessions Court are maintained as such. 

Balancing the two sets of circumstances i.e. one favouring commutation and the other favouring upholding the death penalty, we are of the view that in the present case the option of life sentence is not “unquestionably foreclosed”. The..

Balancing the two sets of circumstances i.e. one favouring commutation and the other favouring upholding the death penalty, we are of the view that in the present case the option of life sentence is not “unquestionably foreclosed”. Therefore, the sentence of death awarded to the accused should be commuted to life imprisonment.

                                       Arms Act, 1959    Code of criminal Procedure, 1973

Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with appeals, particularly, against the order of acquittal: (i) There is no limitation on the part of the Appellate Co..

Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with appeals, particularly, against the order of acquittal: (i) There is no limitation on the part of the Appellate Court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found. (ii) The Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal can review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions. (iii) The Appellate Court can also review the Trial Court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iv) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. (v) An order of acquittal is to be interfered only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. (vi) While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the Appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether finding of the Trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly, erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the Appellate Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the Appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities, it can reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion. (vii) When the Trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of Ballistic Experts etc., the Appellate Court is competent to reverse the decision of the Trial Court depending on the materials placed.

Arms Act, 1959                 &             Indian Penal Code, 1860

The confession was indeed made by the appellant and the details given in the confession and the meticulous planning that went behind committing murder of the deceased which has been reflected in the confession, not only render it voluntary, but tr..

The confession was indeed made by the appellant and the details given in the confession and the meticulous planning that went behind committing murder of the deceased which has been reflected in the confession, not only render it voluntary, but truthful also. This confession is not only a good, voluntary and truthful confession but a reliable one also and the trial court has committed no mistake whatsoever in relying upon the said confession. Once the confession made u/s. 15 of the TADA Act is accepted, there is no necessity of any other evidence being required. The way the appellant himself has worked for the success of the conspiracy, the way he has handled the guns and accompanied two other assailants to the house of the deceased and the manner in which the plan was executed convinces that the order is absolutely correct. [Paras 32 and 33] [950-D-H; 951-A-C] 2.6. The whole cross-examination does not dent the case of the prosecution and it can be inferred that the criticism against the confession that it was not recorded in the language of the accused is not justified. There is absolutely no effort made by the defence to establish that the statement was not made in the language of the accused persons. The confession also cannot be foiled on the ground that the original confessional statement was not on record as the original confession was very much available on the record. [Para 21] [940-D-F] 2.7. The failure to examine two-persons (`GS' and `GQ) as witnesses, would be of no consequence looking at the overall evidence of the witnesses, more particularly, all those who were present at the spot. It cannot be gathered that `GS' was present at the time of incident. Insofar as the evidence of `GQ' is concerned, it was pointed out by PW-17 that said person was already dead at the time of trial. [Para 22] [940-G-H; 941-A-B] 3. It is not correct to say that the confession u/s. 15 of TADA Act could have been used only against the TADA Act offences and it cannot be used for a Non-TADA offence like Section 302 of the RPC and it could not even be read in order to prove the said offence. The facts relating to Section 3(3) of the TADA Act and the facts relating to Section 302 of RPC are completely inter-mixed in this matter. They are the part of the same transaction. A plain reading of the confession clearly goes to show that the accused was guilty of conspiring or attempting to commit or advocating, abetting, advising or inciting or knowingly facilitating the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist act.

In Ashok Kumar's case, this Court noticed that if it was a case of death by burning, entries of injury report in the bed head ticket could be construed as dying declaration. [para 13-14] Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 40..

In Ashok Kumar's case, this Court noticed that if it was a case of death by burning, entries of injury report in the bed head ticket could be construed as dying declaration. [para 13-14] Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 401 = (1991) 1 SCC 166 Kanaksingh Raisingh Rav v. State of Gujarat (2003) 1 SCC 73 - relied on. 1.2 In the instant case, the doctor (PW-4) who conducted medico-legal examination and recorded the statement of the deceased, specifically deposed that the deceased told him that she was called inside and the door was latched from inside. Kerosene oil was sprinkled upon her and her Jethani had ignited the fire by the match stick. Her husband and mother-in- law were also involved in it. This dying declaration (Ext.PF) was also signed by appellant no.1 which indicates that he was present when statement was recorded. There is nothing on the record to suggest that any of the relation of the deceased was present to influence PW-4. [para 11 and 15] 1.3 Admittedly, the death of the deceased is caused by burns i.e. otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage. In view of the evidence on record both the courts below have come to the definite conclusion that the deceased was soon before her death, subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and his relatives in connection with demand for dowry. Therefore, all the ingredients are present to convict the appellants u/s 304-B, IPC. The prosecution also proved beyond reasonable doubts that the appellants are guilty of the offence punishable u/s 498-A, IPC. The Sessions Judge has recorded cogent and convincing reasons for convicting the appellants for the offences u/ss 304-B and 498-A IPC. [para 17-19] 1.4 The Sessions Judge specifically held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case against all the four accused for the offence punishable u/ss 302 and 406 r/w s. 34 IPC and, therefore, all the four accused were acquitted of the said offence. No appeal has been preferred by the complainant or the State against the acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable u/ss 302 and 406 r/w s.34 IPC. The finding of Sessions Judge having reached finality, the question of altering the sentence u/s 304-B to s.302 does not arise. [para 22] Muthu Kutty and Another v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 222 = (2005) 9 SCC 113 - referred to. 1.5 As regards the plea of the appellants to reduce the sentence u/s 304-B IPC, it is significant to note that the appellants were sentenced for life for the offence punishable u/s 304-B IPC, by the trial court. The High Court has already considered the facts and circumstances of the case and reduced the sentence from life imprisonment to 10 years. 

Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 There is prima facie material to establish the involvement of the petitioners in activities violating the provisions of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The consequences of such violation are extrem..

Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 There is prima facie material to establish the involvement of the petitioners in activities violating the provisions of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The consequences of such violation are extremely serious. The minimum punishment on conviction is 10 years rigorousimprisonment. For more serious activities, the punishment can extend to imprisonment for life, and even to death penalty. Some of the accused are still absconding. Obviously, all the accused are financially well placed. Releasing them from jail at this juncture, when the prosecution has not even commenced to examine the main witnesses, could prove detrimental to the eventual outcome of the trial. Atleast till the culmination of the evidence of the material witnesses, it would not be proper to release the petitioners on bail. The impugned orders passed by the High Court are accordingly affirmed. [Para 15] 1.2 It would be just and appropriate to direct the prosecution to first examine the material witnesses. It shall be open to the petitioner (s) to move a fresh application for bail, after the examination of all the material witnesses.

The measure of punishment in a case of rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act. ..

The measure of punishment in a case of rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women need to be severely dealt with. The socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. The sentencing Courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in cases of the heinous crime of rape on innocent helpless girls of tender years, and respond by imposition of proper sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of appropriate sentence by the Court. [Para 8] [279-B, C, D, E] 1.2 The legislative mandate to impose a sentence for the offence of rape on a girl under 12 years of age, for a term which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to life and also to fine reflects the intent of stringency in sentence. The proviso to Section 376(2) IPC lays down that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than 10 years. It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso particularly in such like penal provisions. The courts are obliged to respect the legislative mandate in the matter of awarding of sentence in all such cases. Recourse to the proviso can be had only for "special and adequate reasons" and not in a casual manner. Whether there exist any "special and adequate reasons" would depend upon a variety of factOTHERS and the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule of universal application can be laid down in that behalf. [Para 9] [279-G, H; 280-A, B, C] 2. There are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances available on the record which may justify imposition of any sentence less than the prescribed minimum on the respondent. To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice and the plea for leniency is wholly misplaced. In view of the aforementioned position in law the judgment of the High Court reducing the sentence to 7 years is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. [Paras 8 and 10] [279-E, F; 280-D] Milind Kumar and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Appellant.

The defense has not raised any dispute with regard to the aforesaid fact nor any suggestion was given to the aforesaid eye- witnesses as against their statements that they were present at the time of incident and they had seen the entire incident...

The defense has not raised any dispute with regard to the aforesaid fact nor any suggestion was given to the aforesaid eye- witnesses as against their statements that they were present at the time of incident and they had seen the entire incident. Their presence at the place of occurrence was quite natural. [Para 7] [1131-D-E; 1132-A] 1.2. There is no delay in the lodging of the FIR. There is also no possibility of any concoction of the incident as there was no scope of framing anybody unnecessarily and without reason within that short span of time. The motive for the murder has also been established. [Para 7] [1131- G; 1132-A] 1.3. The lathi blow was so forceful that as a consequence of which the deceased died within an hour and before he could be taken to the hospital. There is a direct nexus between the blow of lathi and death of the deceased which is immediately caused after giving the blow. [Para 11] [1134-B-C] 1.4. Although it is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, but considering the nature of the injuries which was caused on a vital part of the body, there was intention on the part of the accused-appellant to cause death of the deceased. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant is altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 (Part I) IPC. Sentence oflife imprisonment altered to custody and sentence of 10 years. [Paras 12 and 13] [1134-C-E] State of Orissa v. Bhagaban Barik AIR 1987 SC 1265; State of U.P. v. Indrajeet (2000) 7 SCC 249; Joseph v. State of Kerala AIR 1994 SC 34 and Mohd. Shakeel v. State of A.P. (2007) 3 SCC 119, distinguished. Case Law Reference: AIR 1987 SC 1265 Distinguished. Para 10 (2000) 7 SCC 249 Distinguished. Para 10 AIR 1994 SC 34 Distinguished. Para 10 (2007) 3 SCC 119 Distinguished. Para 10 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 996 of 2004. From the Judgment and Order dated 16.4.2003 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal bearing number 1996 of 1981. Vipin Singhania and Manjula Gupta for the Appellants. T.N. Singh, S.K. Dwivedi, Vandana Mishra, Shirish Kr. Mishra and Praveen Swarup for the Respondent

Appellant was inside the house. He admittedly was not a party to the quarrel. So far as he was concerned, neither PW-2 nor the deceased caused any provocation to him. The manner in which the assault had taken place must also be noticed inasmuch as..

Appellant was inside the house. He admittedly was not a party to the quarrel. So far as he was concerned, neither PW-2 nor the deceased caused any provocation to him. The manner in which the assault had taken place must also be noticed inasmuch as he had injured the lung and heart of the deceased. [Para 9] [600-B-C] 2.1. S.300 IPC provides that culpable homicide would be murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or if it is done inter alia with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. Once it is held that injury was caused on a vital part of the body with knowledge that it may cause death or such injury which is likely to cause death, the ingredients of provisions of s.300 must be held to have been proved in view of the decision of this Court in Virsa Singh. This case, thus, although attracts the principles of Virsa Singh in terms whereof it was possible to arrive at a conclusion that the appellant in fact is guilty of commission of an offence under s.302 IPC, in absence of any appeal having been preferred by the State from the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Judge, this Court is not in a position to arrive at the said conclusion. [Paras 10, 13, 14] [600-C-D; 603-A-D] Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR (1958) SC 465; Kesar Singh AND ANOTHER v. State of Haryana (2008) 6 SCALE 433; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and ANOTHER (1976) 4 SCC 382; Mohd. Asif v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 3 SCALE 695 and Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State of Kerala AIR 1997 SC 687 - referred to. 3.1. The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was enacted to provide for the release of offenders on probation or after due admonition and for matters connected therewith. S.4 of the said Act empowers the court to release a person on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions that the offence is not punishable with death or imprison-ment for life. Only in the event, the provisions of the said Act are applicable, s.6 of the Act can be taken recourse to. [Paras 15, 16] [603-D-F] 3.2. Appellant was charged with commission of an offence under s.302 IPC. He has been found guilty under s.304 Part I thereof which provides for imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to imprisonment for life. 

As regards the sentence, motive for the appellant to commit the murder of three persons has not been established. There is also no eyewitness to the manner in which the appellant committed the murder of three persons and the culpability of the app..

As regards the sentence, motive for the appellant to commit the murder of three persons has not been established. There is also no eyewitness to the manner in which the appellant committed the murder of three persons and the culpability of the appellant has been established only by a chain of three circumstances established by the prosecution. The finding of the High Court, therefore, that either ?R? or ?S? had to undergo the trauma of watching the father or the son being killed first in front of the other is a pure surmise. What exactly happened leading to the murder of three persons by the appellant is not known, but what appears from the post mortem reports is that the three deceased persons were brutally killed by the appellant. Brutality would be a relevant factor, but how the same did take place is also a relevant and necessary material to be considered while deciding whether to award life imprisonment or death for the offence of murder. As has been held in Bachan Singh's case, the extreme penalty of death can be inflicted only in gravest cases of extreme culpability and in making choice of the sentence, in addition to the circumstances of the offence, due regard must be paid to the circumstances of the offender also. In the instant case, there is no evidence to establish the gravest case of extreme culpability of the appellant and there is also no evidence to establish the circumstances of the appellant. [Para 22-23] Panchhi AND OTHERS v. State of U. P. 1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40 = AIR 1998 SC 2726

 It provides that such imprisonment orimprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previ..

 It provides that such imprisonment orimprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced unless the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Section 427 (1) of the Code, stipulates a general rule to be followed except in three situations, one falling under the proviso to sub-s (1) to s. 427 i.e. where the person concerned is sentenced to imprisonment by an order u/s. 122 in default of furnishing security which is not the position in the case at hand
the second falling under sub-s (2) where a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonmentfor a term or imprisonment for life
it provides that the subsequent sentence shall in such a case run concurrently with such previous sentence
and the third where the court directs that the sentences shall run concurrently. It is manifest from s. 427 (1) that the court has the power and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the court the discretionary power shall have to be exercised along judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any strait jacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts. Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence (s) committed, and the fact situation in which the question of concurrent running of the sentences arises. High Courts in this country have, therefore, invoked and exercised their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running of sentence* as much as they have declined such benefit to the prisoners**. [Para 8-10] *State of Punjab v. Madan Lal 2009 (3) SCR 1175 = (2009) 5 SCC 238
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector of Customs 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 747 = (1988) 4 SCC 183 and Mulaim Singh v. State 1974 Crl. L.J. 1397 - referred to. **Sumlo ALIAS Sumla Himla Bhuriya and OTHERS v. State of Gujarat and OTHERS 2007 Crl.L.J. 612 and State of Gujarat v. Zaverbhai Kababhai 1996 Crl.L.J. 1296 - referred to. 1.2 The legal position favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan to the creditor. [Para 15] 1.3 The 15 cases at hand against the appellant fall in three distinct categories. The transactions forming the basis of the prosecution relate to three different corporate entities who had either entered into loan transactions with the State Financial Corporation or taken some other financial benefit like purchase of a cheque from the appellant that was on presentation dishonoured. Applying the principle of single transaction each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements was a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant on the one hand and the borrowing company/appellant on the other. If different cheques which are subsequently dishonoured on presentation, are issued by the borrowing company acting through the appellant, the same could be said to be arising out of a single loan transaction so as to justify a direction for concurrent running of the sentences awarded in relation to dishonour of cheques relevant to each such transaction. That being so, the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant in each case relevant to the transaction with each company ought to run concurrently. However, there is no reason to extend that concession to transactions in which the borrowing company is different no matter the appellant before the Court is the promoter/Director of the said other companies also. Similarly, there is no reason to direct running of the sentence concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala which transaction is also independent of any loan or financial assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the borrowing companies. Ordered accordingly. [Para 16 - 17] 1.4 It is made clear that the direction regarding concurrent running of sentence shall be limited to the substantive sentence only. The sentence which the appellant has been directed to undergo in default of payment of fine/compensation shall not be affected by this direction, because the provisions of s. 427 of the Cr.P.C. do not, permit a direction for the concurrent running of the substantive sentences with sentences awarded in default of payment of fine/compensation. [Para 17] Case Law Reference 2009 (3) SCR 1175 referred to para 7 2007 Crl.L.J. 612 referred to para 10 1996 Crl.L.J. 1296 referred to para 11 1974 Crl. L.J. 1397 referred to para 12 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 747 referred to para 13. 

The conduct of the petitioner in not reporting the matter to the petitioner and, on the other hand, burying the body of the victim in an attempt to shield himself of the offence, does enure to the benefit of the petitioner. Had it not been for the..

The conduct of the petitioner in not reporting the matter to the petitioner and, on the other hand, burying the body of the victim in an attempt to shield himself of the offence, does enure to the benefit of the petitioner. Had it not been for the insistence of PW-1, such evidence may have gone completely unnoticed. It is only on account of his insistence that the body of the victim was exhumed, and, thereafter, subjected to post mortem examination which, ultimately, revealed the fact that it was not simply a stomach pain which caused the death of the victim but the several injuries which had been caused to her. The very fact that he tried to hide the evidence, resulted in his conviction also under Section 201 IPC. In such circumstances, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court as far as conviction and sentence is concerned. [Paras 3 and 4] 2.1. Life imprisonment is not to be interpreted as being imprisonment for the whole of a convict's natural life within the scope of Section 45 of IPC. On a conjoint reading of Sections 45 and 47 IPC and Sections 432, 433 and 433A Cr.P.C., it is well established that a convict awarded lifesentence has to undergo imprisonment for at least 14 years. While Sections 432 and 433 empowers the appropriate Government to suspend, remit or commute sentences, including a sentence of death and life imprisonment, a fetter has been imposed by the legislature on such powers by the introduction of Section 433A into Cr.P.C. by the Amending Act of 1978. [Paras 15 and 16] 2.2. By virtue of the non-obstante clause used in Section 433A Cr.P.C., the minimum term of imprisonmentin respect of an offence where death is one of the punishments provided by laws or where a death sentence has been commuted to life sentence, has been prescribed as 14 years. In the various decisions, "imprisonment for life" has been repeatedly held to mean imprisonment for the natural life term of a convict, though the actual period of imprisonment may stand reduced on account of remissions earned. But in no case, with the possible exception of the powers vested in the President under Article 72 of the Constitution and the power vested in the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution, even with remissions earned, can a sentence of imprisonment for life be reduced to below 14 years. It is thereafter left to the discretion of the concerned authorities to determine the actual length ofimprisonment having regard to the gravity and intensity of the offence. [Para 16] 2.3. In the facts of the present case, it is not a fit case where the petitioner should be released on completion of 14 years imprisonment. The petitioner's case for premature release may be taken up by the authorities concerned, after he completes 20 years imprisonment, including remissions earned.

Dismissing the appeals, the court HELD : High Court considered the question of Sentence in detail. On going through the evidence and having considered the facts of the case, there is no reason to enhance the punishment of life